Rewards for information provision in patient referrals: A theoretical model and an experimental test.

We study whether bonus payments for information provision can improve the information flow between physicians. A primary care physician (PCP) decides on the provision of information of varying qualities to a specialist while referring a patient. Our theoretical model, which includes altruism and loss aversion, predicts that bonus payments increase the provision of both high- and low-quality information. Running a controlled laboratory experiment we find support for this prediction. If the beneficiary of information provision receives a higher payoff than the PCP, we observe that PCPs more often pass on high-quality information when the beneficiary is a patient. If the beneficiary receives a lower payoff than the PCP, the type of the beneficiary (specialist or patient) does not affect the provision of high-quality information.

Resource scarcity and prioritization decisions in medical care: A lab experiment with heterogeneous patient types.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, health care systems around the world have received additional funding, while at other times, financial support has been lowered to consolidate public spending. Such budget changes likely affect provision behavior in health care. We study how different degrees of resource scarcity affect medical service provision and, in consequence, patients' health. In a controlled lab environment, physicians are paid by capitation and allocate limited resources to several patients. This implies a trade-off between physicians' profits and patients' health benefits. We vary levels of resource scarcity and patient characteristics systematically and observe that most subjects in the role of physician devote a relatively stable share of budget to patient treatment, implying that they provide fewer services when they face more severe budget constraints. Average patient benefits decrease in proportion to physician budgets. The majority of subjects chooses an allocation that leads to equal patient benefits as opposed to allocating resources efficiently.